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Abstract: 
This paper studies how economic institutions affect private firm sectors capital accumulation through 
finance sector and operation objectives of different ownership firms in socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics, which extended the neo-classical economic growth method. Based on above 
framework, this paper finds that economic institutions were the main factors affecting the efficiency of 
capital allocation between private sector and stated-owned sector. Compared with stated-owned sector, 
economic institutions lead private sector to a decrease in loans and government subsidies through finance 
sector, and an increase in its production costs. Our evidence suggests that private firms take efforts to 
improve economic institutions as a substitute for political capital. 
JEl：P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions 
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1. Introduction 
Benefits from reform and opening up, human capital and physical capital accumulation, promotion 
of factor allocation efficiency and technological progress, the Chinese economy has remained sustained 
high growth for nearly forty years. However, with China’s economic growth entered the stage of medium-
speed growth, the problems of economic institutions in the process of economic development have 
become obvious. Ownership discrimination that stated-owned enterprise and private enterprise faced 
different treatment when they raise funds for investment through the financial sector. State-owned 
enterprises with low return on investment could more easily obtain loans from the financial sector with 
more relaxed loan conditions; private enterprises with higher return on capital were constrained by 
financing difficulties and had to rely more on their own internal accumulation. The difference in 
financing conditions made it impossible for capital to flow to production areas with higher marginal 
output, which restricts the efficiency of factor allocation and caused the loss of total social output (Song 
et al., 2011); the inefficiency of factor allocation was also found in other aspects, such as the regional 
market segmentation, the low efficiency of capital space allocation, the blocked capital mobility, the 
slowing down of capital accumulation rate and of the technological progress of the “learn by doing”. 
Under the combined influence of the above factors, China’s economic growth rate has begun to slow 
down and total factor productivity has stagnated (Li et al., 2018). 
China’s economic growth rate and total factor productivity both had an upward trend between 1997 
and 2007. After 2008, China’s economic growth rate became a downward trend, and total factor 
productivity stagnated. Faced with the downward pressure on economic growth, the party’s report on the 
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed: further deepening reforms, 
continuing to release the institutional dividends of reforms; reducing government intervention in 
economic operations, and exerting market regulation on resource allocation to enhance resource 
allocation for the promotion of capital allocation efficiency and economic growth rate. However, the 
existing literature on the slowdown of economic growth mostly analyzed the efficiency of production 
factor allocation or technological progress within the framework of the new economic growth theory, but 
ignored the impact of economic institutions on economic growth. The economic institutions studied in 
this paper did not include all the contents of the economic systems, but only the economic institutional 
factors related to the enterprise property ownership and economic operation coordination institutions. 
That is to say, the current market coordination mechanism in China has different financial constraints on 
the differences in financing constraints between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, and the 
impact of firm property ownership on decision-making goals. How does the economic institutional factor 
affect the scale of firm finance, and how does it affect the efficiency of capital allocation? What kind of 
transmission method is affecting economic growth? The above questions are the focus of this paper. 
This paper is structured as follows. The second part define the economic institutions, discusses the 
interaction mechanism between institution and economic growth, and makes a literature review on the 
empirical evidence of China since 2000. The third part describes the model and characterizes the 
equilibrium. The fourth part gives the empirical analysis. The conclusion is made in the final part. 
2. Literature Review 
The definition of economic institutions in the paper mainly refers to two aspects: the property 
ownership and the economic operation coordination mechanism. Property ownership is defined through 
law, which incentives the reasonable use of property, and sanctions for abuse. The second aspect of the 
economic operation coordinating mechanism. The core is the rules of factors allocation and the rules of 
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product exchange. In theory, there are four typical combinations of property ownership and economic 
operation coordination mechanism: public-owned planned economy, public-owned market economy, 
private-owned planned economy, and private-owned market economy. Single public ownership 
institutions with a single private ownership, purely planned economy, and purely market economy are 
not effective institutional arrangements. China’s current institutional choice is a mixed economy type 
that emphasizes the public ownership and market coordination mechanism in nature, while developing 
the private economy and using policy guidance, that is, the socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics. This mix economy can avoid the inevitable monopoly and welfare losses under pure 
market conditions, and can make up for the inflexibility and inefficiency of purely centralized planning. 
Based on the above discussion, the economic institutions studied in this paper includes two aspect, 
namely: the impact of property ownership on firm decision-making objectives; the impact of China’s 
current market regulation and government macro-control coordination mechanism on firm financing. 
About the driving force of economic growth, new economic growth theories have shown that the 
accumulation of human capital, physical capital, and technology are main factors (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 
1988; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2014). The new economic growth theory was to explain the 
sustained economic growth by analyzing the accumulation of human capital and physical capital, the 
efficiency of capital allocation, and the endogenous technology within a given framework of economic 
institutions (Cox, 2017). However, if there is no institutional environment compatible with economic 
development, institutional factors may have a negative effect on factor allocation and technological 
progress (Avner G, 2017). It may also constrain economic growth. A number of empirical studies also 
have proved that institution did have a positive effect on economic growth (Fernández&Tamayo, 2017; 
Langlois, 2017; Nikolaev & Salahodjaev, 2017). There are three main channels that institution affect 
economic growth. First, institutions affected technological innovation via the mechanism of “property 
rights institutions- capital investment - productivity - per capita output” (Egidi, 2017; Davidson, 2018). 
Second, institutions affected technological human capital accumulation. The institutions of income 
distribution affected economic growth by influencing the amount of investment in education (Barro & 
Lee, 2013; Aguirre, 2017; Pastor et al., 2018). Acemoglu (2014) argued that whether human capital 
investment could drive economic growth depended on the institutional environment. A similar analysis 
by Della Posta et.al (2017) shows that the key to institutional impact on human capital is that it determines 
the return on education. Third, the better the institutions, the more mature a market is. If the institutions 
lack fairness, it is easy to breed rent-seeking opportunities (Constantine ,2017; Wako, 2018; Nguyen et 
al., 2019)  
For a developing country like China that has transformed from a planned economy to a socialist 
market economy and its economic institutions are still in a period of continuous improvement (Bennett, 
2017; Gagliardi, 2017). Its forty years economic growth cannot be fully explained only by the 
accumulation of human and physical capital, the improvement of factors allocation efficiency and 
technological progress. On the contrary, the continuous improvement of economic institutions cannot be 
ignored for economic growth（Xi, 2017）. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate economic institutional 
factors into the analytical framework of economic growth. Although the new institutional economics 
introduces institutional factors into the analytical framework, it mainly uses the method of logical 
reasoning at the level of speculation, which is insufficient in quantitative analysis and empirical 
verification. In this paper, through adding economic institutional factors into the new economic growth 
model, studied the transmission mechanism of economic institutions affecting economic growth, and 
analyzed the influence of economic institutions on economic growth.  
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3. Theoretical Model 
3.1 Household sector 
A representative household consists of a single individual whose descendants continue indefinitely; 
the family derives its utility from consumption, and its preferences can be expressed by the constant 
relative risk aversion utility function, whose utility function is: 
 U(𝐶$) = 𝐶$'()1 − 𝜃	 （1） 
Here, 𝐶$ denotes household consumption in period 𝑡 , 1/θ the replacement elasticity of the 
intertemporal consumption, θ > 1. 
The initial capital stock of the household sector is zero, and its income is derived from the wages 
by providing effective labor to the firm sector and the provision of monetary capital to the financial sector. 
In the period 𝑡, the household provides 𝐻$,4 effective labor to different ownership firms, and obtains 
labor income 𝑤$,4 , or engage in economic institutional improvement 𝐻$,6 , and obtain labor income 
according to wage rate 𝑤$,6; and lends 𝑀$ currency capital to the financial sector at the interest rate 𝑟$. 
Labor and capital income are used to consume 𝐶$  and savings 𝑀$ , which is reflected in the 
accumulation of monetary capital in the household sector. The household problem is to maximize (1) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
 ?̇?$ = 𝑤$,:𝐻$,: +𝑤$,<𝐻$,< +𝑤$,6𝐻$,6 + 𝑟$𝑀$ − 𝐶$ （2） 
Maximization the household sector long-term utility, and its consumption path is: 
 
𝐶$̇𝐶$ =	𝑟$ − 𝜌
>𝜃  （3） 
As formula (3) shows that the main influencing factors affecting the consumption path of the 
household sector are the deposit interest rate 𝑟$ , the time preference 𝜌> , and the intertemporal 
substitution elasticity 𝜃 of consumption. 
3.2 Finance sector 
This section builds a financial sector credit decision model, which derives the mechanism of “price 
discrimination” in financial markets under the Chinese characteristics economic institutions. 
To simplify the analysis, the financial sector is assumed to be a frictionless intermediary. Its role is 
to absorb the savings of the household sector at a certain deposit rate per period, fully convert it into 
firms’ credit capital (𝑀$ = 𝐼$), and allocate credit capital to different ownership firms at a certain loan 
interest rate. As an agent of the household sector, its decision-making objective is to maximize financial 
services, but is influenced by policy factors1. 
When constructing the utility function of the financial sector, considering the influence of 
institutional factors, the loan income 𝜋$,: obtained from the state-owned enterprise and the loan income 𝜋$,< obtained from the private enterprise are differentiated, that is, the two cannot be completely replaced, 
the corresponding utility evaluation weight (utility elasticity) is 𝜇 and 1 − 𝜇, 0 < 𝜇 < 1. With the 
continuous improvement of the economic institutions, the influence of policy factors on the credit 
decision of the finance sector is decreasing. The policy factor is a dynamic variable and an endogenous 
 
1 Refer to Becker (1957), economic agents are concerned about political demands in addition to profits. 
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variable. 𝐺$ is the influence of policy factors on the utility evaluation of the finance sector, which is 
related with the economic institutions. To ensure that the model has a stable equilibrium solution, the 
policy factors is expressed as the function 𝐺$ = 𝐺(𝜗$), let 𝐺$  be a convex function, 0 ≤ 𝐺$ < 1， 𝐺G < 0, indicating that the more perfect the economic institutions, the smaller the impact of policy factors 
on the finance sector, the higher the independent decision-making of the finance sector. The following is 
the utility function of finance sector: 
 𝑈 = 𝜋$,:IJKL𝜋$,<'(I （4） 
Here, 𝜋$,4 = M1 − 𝑒$,4O𝑟$,4𝐼$,4, 𝜒 = {𝑆, 𝑃}, 𝑆 denotes state-owned firm, and 𝑃 private firm. 𝑟$,4 
indicates the interest rate of the financial sector loan to the firm sector. The loan interest rate is a function 
of the loan amount, which satisfies the following relationship: when the financial sector expands the 
scale of lending, the willingness of the firm sector to pay the loan interest rate will decrease, and vice 
versa, ∂𝑟$,4 𝜕𝐼$,4 < 0⁄ . 𝐼$,4  indicates the amount of funds that the financial sector lends to the firm 
sector. 𝑒$,4 indicates the default rate of the firm sector. The higher the financial sector’s mastery of firm 
credit qualification information or the closer the financial sector’s business relationship with the firm 
sector, the lower the probability of firm sector default rate. In particular, state-owned firms are mostly 
large-scale, long-term business, complete financial statements, and long-term cooperation with the 
financial sector, all of which reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the financial sector 
and state-owned firms. As a result, the financial sector has a high level of convenience in gathering 
information and monitoring compliance. Most of China’s private enterprises are small and medium-sized 
enterprises, not only financial institutions and information disclosure mechanisms are not perfect. Under 
the same conditions, the probability of default of private firms is higher than that of state-owned firms, 
that is, 𝑒$,< > 𝑒$,:. 
The credit capital constraint equation for the financial sector is as follows: 
 𝑀$ = 𝐼$,: + 𝐼$,< （5） 
Maximizing the utility of the financial sector, then the investment2are: 
 𝐼$,< = 𝑀$ 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺$ （6） 
 	𝐼$,: = 𝑀$ 𝜇 + 𝐺$1 + 𝐺$ （7） 
It can be seen from equations (6) and (7) that in the financial market environment with limited 
interest rate fluctuations, the scale of financial sector loans to state-owned firms and private firms is not 
affected by the interest rate of loans, nor the impact of firm loan default rates. It also shows that the 
finance sector chooses to provide more loans to low-risk, high-yield companies on the basis of comparing 
the default risks of different firms is a rational market behavior. However, from the equation (6), (7) it 
can also be seen that the scale of loans of state-owned firms and private firms are affected by policy 
factors. The scale of loans of state-owned firms is proportional to the inclination of their policies, ∂𝐼$,:/𝜕𝐺 > 0. The relationship between the scale of loans of private firms is reversed, that is, ∂𝐼$,</𝜕𝐺 <
 
2 For a long time, the floating rate of loan interest rates in China’s financial sector has been controlled by the central bank, 
and it has not achieved full marketization, and its floating range is limited. Therefore, the loan interest rate has a small elasticity to 
the loan scale, which can be approximated to zero, that is, 𝜀4 = 0. 
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0. In other words, the more obvious the government’s policy tendency toward state-owned firms, the 
more the distribution of credit resources is biased toward state-owned firms. In the distribution of credit 
resources in China, there is indeed a phenomenon in which the government intervention replaces market 
for credit allocation. It is consistent with the situation of “zombie firms” in which the state-owned firm 
sector has a large number of loans to survive, and the private firms facing “funding difficulties”. 
PROPOSITION 1: When the economic institutions is gradually improved and the government’s 
intervention in the finance sector is close to zero, that is, the parameter 𝐺$ , the credit resources 
allocation of the finance sector will be fully regulated by the market, and the credit resources will be 
allocated in accordance with marginal replacement rate in the evaluation of utility of the finance sector 
between different firms sectors. At the time, the development of finance markets tends to be perfect. 
3.3 Firm sector 
There are two types of property ownership firm in China’s current economic institutions, state-
owned and private-owned, and their business objectives are different. In view of the differences in 
business objectives of different ownership firms, this section separately constructs investment decision 
models for different ownership firms. In order to simplify the model, it is assumed that the products 
produced by different ownership firms are homogeneous, and the total human resources stock 𝐻$ is 
given. The proportion of human capital in state-owned firms and private firms depends on the 
composition of the two types of firm sector 𝜑 (the proportion of state-owned firm) or (1 − 𝜑) (the 
proportion of private firm). 
3.3.1 Private firm 
Assuming that the input-output relationship of private enterprises (P) satisfies the Cobb-Douglas 
form, it can be expressed as: 
 𝑌$,< = 𝐾$,<\]M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\] （8） 𝑌$,< indicates the output of private firm in period 𝑡; 𝐾$,< indicates the capital stock input of private 
firm in period 𝑡, (1 − 𝜑)𝐻$ indicates the human capital investment of private firm in period 𝑡, 𝛼< 
and 1 − 𝛼<  represent the output elasticity of physical capital 𝐾$,<  and human capital (1 − 𝜑)𝐻$ , 
respectively. 
As the agent of the owner, the operators of the private firm are committed to maximizing the profit 
of the company in the period of operation of the agent. The objective function of private firm is: 
 π$,< = 𝑌$,< − 𝑟$,<𝐼$,< − 𝑟$(',<𝐾$(',< −𝑤$,<(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$ （9） 
Here, π$,< is the profit of private firm; 𝑌$,< is the output of private firm; (1 − 𝜑)𝐻$ and 𝐾$(',< 
are the human capital input in period 𝑡 and physical capital stock in the previous period; 𝐼$,< is the 
investment and financing scale of private firm in period 𝑡; 𝑟$,< is the loan interest rate o; 𝑤$,< is the 
unit income of human capital. 
To simplify the model, this paper ignores physical capital depreciation. Physical capital 
accumulation meets the following conditions: 
 𝐾$,< = 𝐼$,< +𝐾$(',< （10） 
The first-order conditions for private firm to maximize profits are: 
 𝐼$,< = 𝛼<1 − 𝛼< 𝑤$,<(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$𝑟$,< −𝐾$(',< （11） 
It can be known from equation (11) that the main factors affecting the investment scale 𝐼$,< of 
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private firm include capital output elasticity 𝛼<, loan interest rate 𝑟$,<, and unit human capital wage 𝑤$,< . The greater the capital output elasticity 𝛼< , the more firm tends to adopt capital-intensive 
production mode. At this time, the firm sector will expand investment; otherwise, the investment in the 
enterprise sector will decrease. 𝑟$,< has an negative effect on investment, while the rise of 	𝑤$,< has 
prompted the investment of firm. 
3.3.2 State-owned firm 
Similar to private firm, the production function of state-owned firm can be expressed as: 
 𝑌$,: = 𝐾$,:\`(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` （12） 
𝑌$,: indicates the output of state-owned firm in period 𝑡; 𝐾$,: indicates the capital stock input of 
state-owned firm in period 𝑡, 𝜑𝐻$indicates the human capital investment of state-owned firm in period 𝑡, 𝛼: and 1 − 𝛼: represent the output elasticity of physical capital and human capital, respectively. 
State-owned firm also have the characteristics of “profit” and “sociality”: 
1) profit is that state-owned firm pay equal attention to profits in terms of their own development; 
2) sociality is that state-owned firm are not only the foundation of the socialist economy with 
Chinese characteristics, but also have certain policy functions. Therefore, in pursuit of profits, they also 
pursue the expansion of total assets. The investment objective function of state-owned firm in period 𝑡 
can be expressed as: 
 π$,: = 𝑌$,: − 𝑟$,:𝐼$,: − 𝑟$(',:𝐾$(',: −𝑤$,:𝜑𝐻$ + 𝜙M𝐼$,: +𝐾$(',:O （13） 
Here,	π$,: is the profit; 𝑌$,: is the added value; 𝜑𝐻$ and 𝐾$(',: are the human capital stock in 
period 𝑡 and	Physical capital stock in previous period;	𝐼$,: is the investment and financing scale; 𝑟$,: 
is the loan interest rate; 𝑤$,: is the wage of human capital. Relative to the profit target, the weight of 
evaluation of the asset size is 𝜙; when 𝜙 rises, firm will pay more attention to the expansion of asset 
scale; the change of 𝜙 also reflects that the business objectives of state-owned firm may be affected by 
national policy factors. 
Similar to the treatment of private firm, this paper ignores the depreciation of physical capital. The 
physical capital accumulation of state-owned firm meets the following conditions:  
 𝐾$,: = 𝐼$,: +𝐾$(',: （14） 
Here,	𝐼$,: represents the investment of state-owned enterprises in period 𝑡. 
The first-order conditions for state-owned firm to maximize profits are: 
 𝐼$,: = 𝛼:1 − 𝛼: 𝑤$,:𝜑𝐻$𝑟$,: − 𝜙 − 𝐾$(',: （15） 
As is shown in equation (15) , similar to private firm, the investment scale of state-owned firm 𝐼$,: 
is not only affected by capital output elasticity 𝛼:，loan interest rate 𝑟$,: and wage rate 𝑤$,:, but also 
affected by the target weight 𝜙 of the state-owned firm assets. The greater the target weight 𝜙, the more 
state-owned firm attention to the expansion of asset scale in period 𝑡, and the corresponding increase in 
investment. At this time, the investment scale of state-owned firm will be higher than the scale of 
investment when pursuing profit maximization; on the contrary, the investment scale of state-owned firm 
will approach the scale of investment with the objectives of maximizing profits. 
3.4 Comparative static analysis 
According to equations (11) and (15), then can conclude the main factors affecting the investment 
scale of state-owned firm and private firm as table 1 is shown.  
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Table 1 Comparative static analysis results 
          Exogenous variable     
Endogenous variable 
𝛼< 𝑟$,< 𝑤$,<  
𝐼$,< ＋ － ＋  
     Exogenous variable      
Endogenous variable 
𝛼: 𝑟$,: 𝑤$,: 𝜙 
𝐼$,: ＋ － ＋ ＋ 
Note: The “-” indicates negatively correlated; “+” indicates positively correlated. 
Define 𝐷𝛼<: = 𝛼<(1 − 𝛼:) (1 − 𝛼<)𝛼:⁄  indicates the difference in capital output elasticity; 𝐷𝑤$<: = 𝑤$,</𝑤$,: the difference in unit human capital wage; and using 𝐷𝑟$<: = 𝑟$,c/M𝑟$,: − 𝜙O the 
difference in unit financing cost. At this time, equations (3-23) and (3-29) can be rewritten as:  
 𝐷𝑘$<: = 𝐷𝛼<:𝐷𝑤$<:/𝐷𝑟$<: （16） 
It can be known from equation (16) that the main factors affecting the efficiency of capital allocation 
include the difference in capital output elasticity, the difference in unit financing cost and the difference 
in unit human capital wage. The greater the difference in capital output elasticity between state-owned 
firm and private firm, the more credit capital of the finance sector flowing to state-owned firm. However, 
as the marginal returns of state-owned firm gradually decrease, the investment scale of state-owned firm 
will gradually shrink. At the same time, the investment of private firm will gradually increase. After 
market regulation, the distribution of credit capital between state-owned firm and private firm will reach 
the market clearing. The greater the difference in loan interest rates between state-owned firm and private 
firm, the greater the flow of credit funds from the finance sector to state-owned firm. However, due to 
the pursuit of asset size by state-owned firm, the marginal output of state-owned firm will be lower than 
the loan interest rate of the finance sector. In China’s socialist economic institutions, state-owned firm 
have both “profit” and “sociality” characteristics. As a result, state-owned firm do have rapid 
accumulation of physical capital, excessive investment, and low physical efficiency using the economic 
measurement indicators. Private firm faced with the difficulty of financing and limited capital 
accumulation. 
PROPOSITION 2: Target difference and loan interest rate difference are the main factors affecting 
the difference in capital allocation efficiency between state-owned firm and private firm. If only used 
economic indicators to measure the efficiency of capital allocation, as long as the state-owned firm have 
the target weight of the asset size, the above-mentioned differences in capital allocation efficiency will 
always exist. Moreover, the marginal output of state-owned firm will be lower than the lending rate of 
the finance sector. However, state-owned firm’s loss of physical capital allocation can be compensated 
by institutional objectives gains. This phenomenon is determined by the characteristics of the Chinese 
economic institutions. 
3.5 Economic equilibrium 
Since it is assumed that there is no friction in the finance sector and only intermediary services are 
provided, its function is to completely convert the monetary capital from the household sector into credit 
capital, and allocate the credit capital to different ownership firm with different loan rate. When the 
financial market is cleared, the finance sector’s loan income from different ownership firm is equal to 
the sum of the household sector’s monetary capital interest income, which satisfies the following 
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conditions: 
 
𝑟$𝑀$ = (1 − 𝜏)M1 − 𝑒$,:OM𝛼:𝐾$,:\`('(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` + 𝜙O𝐼$,:
+ M1 − 𝑒$,<O𝛼<𝐾$,<\]('M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\]𝐼$,< （17） 
Combining the equations (6), (7), (11), and (15) into (17), then can obtain: 
 𝑟$ = 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,:OM𝛼:𝐾$,:\`('(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` + 𝜙O
+ 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,<O𝛼<𝐾$,<\]('M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\] 
（18） 
When the finance market is clear, the marginal output of capital and the loan interest rate between 
different ownership firms meet the following conditions: 
 𝑟$,< = 𝑟$,: + 𝜙 （19） 
The growth path of household sector consumption obtained by dynamic optimization is: 
 
𝐶$̇𝐶$ = f𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,:OM𝛼:𝐾$,:\`('(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` + 𝜙O
+ 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,<O𝛼<𝐾$,<\]('M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\]g	1𝜃 − 𝜌>𝜃  
（20） 
According to equation (2) and the perpetual inventory method of physical capital accumulation, the 
capital accumulation equations of state-owned firm and private firm are: 
 ?̇?$,: = 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 (𝐾$,:\`(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` +𝐾$,<\]M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\] − 𝐶$)	 （21） 
 ?̇?$,< = 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺 (𝐾$,:\`(𝜑𝐻$)'(\` +𝐾$,<\]M(1 − 𝜑)𝐻$O'(\] − 𝐶$)	 （22） 
Define 𝑐$ = 𝐶$ 𝐻$⁄  as the unit human capital consumption; 𝑘$,: = 𝐾$,: 𝜑𝐻$⁄ state-owned firm unit 
human capital physical capital;	𝑘$,< = 𝐾$,< (1 − 𝜑)𝐻$⁄  private firm unit human capital physical capital. 
According to (3-34), (3-35), and (3-36), then can obtain: 
 
𝑐$̇𝑐$ = f𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,:OM𝛼:𝑘$,:\`(' + 𝜙$O + 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺 M1 − 𝑒$,<O𝛼<𝑘$,<\]('g	1𝜃 − 𝜌
>𝜃  （23） 
Then, the capital accumulation equations of state-owned firm and private firm are: 
 ?̇?$,: = 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 (𝑘$,:\` + 1 − 𝜑𝜑 𝑘$,<\] − 1𝜑 𝑐$)	 （24） 
 ?̇?$,< = 1 − 𝜇1 + 𝐺 ( 𝜑1 − 𝜑𝑘$,:\` + 𝑘$,<\] − 11 − 𝜑 𝑐$)	 （25） 
The economic system can be described by three differential equations of equations (23), (24), and 
(25) containing 𝑘$,:, 𝑘$,< and 𝑐$. 
3.6 Balanced growth path 
The economic system satisfies the condition at steady state, 𝑐$̇ 𝑐$⁄ = 0 , ?̇?$,: 𝑘$,:i = 0  and ?̇?$,< 𝑘$,<i = 0. At this time, the solution is that the economic system is in equilibrium when consumption 
is 𝑐$∗, the state-owned firm unit human capital physical capital stock 𝑘$,:∗ and the private enterprise 
unit human capital physical capital stock 𝑘$,<∗: 
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 𝑘$,:∗ = k 𝛼:(1 − 𝑒$,< + 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 (𝑒$,< − 𝑒$,:)	𝜌> − 𝜙(1 − 𝑒$,< + 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 (𝑒$,< − 𝑒$,:)l
''(\`
 （26） 
 𝑘$,<∗ = k𝛼<(1 − 𝑒$,< + 𝜇 + 𝐺1 + 𝐺 (𝑒$,< − 𝑒$,:)	𝜌> l
''(\] 	 （27） 
 𝑐$∗ = 𝜑M𝑘$,:∗O \`'(\` + (1 − 𝜑)M𝑘$,<∗O \]'(\] 	 （28） 
PROPOSITION 3: Only when the parameter satisfies the following condition 0 < 𝜌> − 𝜙(1 −
𝑒$,< + IJK'JK (𝑒$,< − 𝑒$,:), there may be a balanced growth path in the economic system. 
Proposition 3 states: (i) appropriate policy objectives can help resolve market failures and promote 
economic growth; (ii) state-owned firm should aim at the asset weights in coordination with policy 
objectives. If Proposition 3 is not met, there is no stable equilibrium point in the economic system, or 
even if there is an economic equilibrium point, the equilibrium point is extremely unstable, and any slight 
disturbance will cause the economic system to permanently deviate from the equilibrium point. 
According to equation (26) and (27), the factor of influence on the scale of investment in the 
equilibrium state 𝑘$,4∗ is not only affected by the elasticity of capital output 𝛼4, but also by the cost of 
default of the enterprise 𝑒$,4, the maturity of the financial market 𝜇 and the impact of the policy factor 𝐺. The greater the capital output elasticity 𝛼4, the more the firm sector tends to adopt capital-intensive 
production mode, and then the firm sector will expand investment to accumulate capital. The higher the 
enterprise’s default cost 𝑒$,4, the higher the financing cost set by the finance sector for its loans, the 
lower the investment scale, and the lower the unit’s human capital physical capital stock. The closer the 
maturity of the finance market 𝜇 to 1⁄2, the less evaluation difference of the finance sector between 
different ownership firm. The smaller the difference in investment scale obtained by the enterprise sector, 
the smaller the difference in capital stock between different ownership enterprises. The higher the policy 
influencing factor 𝐺, the more finance sector investment will be biased towards state-owned firm. The 
investment scale of state-owned firm will continue to expand. The balance of human capital and physical 
capital will increase during the equilibrium, while the scale of investment obtained by private firm will 
continue to decrease, the stock of capital physical capital decreased. In addition to the above-mentioned 
common factors affecting the physical capital stock of unit human capital in the equilibrium of different 
ownership firm, the object weight 𝜙 of the pursuit of asset scale expansion in the decision-making of 
state-owned firm is also positive for the physical capital stock. If 𝜙 increases, state-owned firm will 
expand the current investment, and the investment scale will be higher than the single target profit 
maximization; on the contrary, state-owned firm will reduce the current investment scale. From the 
perspective of economic indicators, there is indeed a loss of economic efficiency in state-owned firm 
investment. However, from the perspective of policy and institutional indicators, the economic efficiency 
loss of state-owned firm can be compensated by their policy efficiency and institutional efficiency. It is 
worth noting that the scale of firm investment 𝑘$,4∗ in equilibrium state has no relationship with the 
distribution share of human capital between state-owned firm and private firm. All the results are shown 
in table 2. 
PROPOSITION 4: Under the environment of the current economic institutions, when the market is 
clear, the physical capital stock of the private firm is equal to the capital stock when profit maximization; 
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while the state-owned firm pursues the maximization of profit and takes into account the expansion of 
the asset scale, the physical capital stock is greater than the capital stock when the profit is maximized. 
From the economic indicators, the state-owned firm do have economic efficiency losses, but from the 
perspective of policy and institutional indicators, the economic efficiency loss of state-owned firm can 
be compensated through their policy efficiency. When the parameters meet the following conditions: 
when the goal of state-owned firm is gradually simplistic, that is, the pursuit of asset size by state-owned 
firm approaches zero when 𝜙 → 0. At this time, the investment objective of state-owned firm is consistent 
with that of private firm, and they are all pursuing profit maximization. The model is standard firm sector 
in new classic economic growth. 
Table 2 Comparative static analysis results 
           Exogenous variable   
Endogenous variable 
𝛼< 𝑒$,< 𝜇 𝐺  
𝐼$,< ＋ - + -  
        Exogenous variable     
Endogenous variable 
𝛼: 𝑒$,: 𝜇 𝐺 𝜙 
𝐼$,: ＋ - + + + 
Note: The “-” indicates negatively correlated; “+” indicates positively correlated. 
4. Regression analysis 
4.1 Econometric model 
In order to simplify the model, this section makes the following assumptions: 1) Whether state-
owned firm or private firm, the output elasticity of physical capital and human capital is constant; 2) the 
human capital of state-owned firm and private firm is homogeneous, besides the change in the share of 
human capital is approximately zero. Based on the above assumptions, the Taylor series expansion of the 
equation (3-30), taking its constant term and the approximation of the first term, can obtain the difference 
equation of the per capita investment of the firm sector: 
 Δ𝐷𝑘$<: = 𝑎p + 𝑎'Δ𝐷𝑟$<: + 𝑎qΔ𝐷𝑤$<: （29） 
Then, the regression econometric model as follows： 
 Δ𝐷𝑘$<: = 𝑎p + 𝑎'Δ𝐷𝑟$<: + 𝑎qΔ𝐷𝑤$<: + 𝜀$ （30） 
4.2 Data description 
The research sample of quantitative analysis in this paper is private industrial enterprises and state-
owned industrial enterprises. The main data used in this paper are taken from the “China Statistical 
Yearbook”, “China Labor Statistics Yearbook”, “China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook” and 
“China Financial Statistics Yearbook”. Other parts of the data are further measured based on available 
data. The years of the time series data in this paper was 1999-2017, because the starting year of the 
hierarchically education employee data was available from 1998. In the statistical yearbook, the statistics 
of the industrial enterprise sector are divided into three categories: state-owned and state-controlled 
industrial enterprises, private industrial enterprises, foreign investment industrial enterprises including 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This paper selects the statistical data of state-owned and state-controlled 
industrial enterprises and private industrial enterprises as the approximation of the data of state-owned 
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industrial enterprises and private industrial enterprises. 
For the economic output, this paper used value added tax of industrial added value as a substitute 
for the output of the industrial sector. About the data of physical capital stock and human capital stock 
details see Li et al. (2018)  
Per capita capital stock difference. The difference in the per capita capital stock of the enterprise 
sector is equal to the per capita physical capital of the private industrial enterprises compared with the 
per capita physical capital of the state-owned industrial enterprises. 
Per capita wage difference. The wage difference in the enterprise sector is equal to the per capita 
wage of private industrial enterprises compared with the per capita wage of state-owned industrial 
enterprises. As the data on per capita wages of private and state-owned industrial enterprises is not 
available, this paper selects the “Annual Survey of Urban Non-Private Units and the Index-State-owned 
Units” in the “China Statistical Yearbook” as the proxy variable of the per capita wage of state-owned 
industrial enterprises. The average wages and indices of non-private units in cities and towns-other units 
are similar to the proxy variables of per capita wages of private industrial enterprises. According to the 
data of agency variables, the wage difference of enterprise departments is further calculated. 
 Financing price difference. The difference in financing prices of the finance sector between 
different firm sectors is not only affected by the respective credit qualification information of the 
enterprises, but also by the maturity of the financial market. As the development of China’s financial 
market is not mature enough, the direct financing channels of the finance sector are subject to many 
restrictions, resulting in the financing mainly by indirect financing, which makes the financial 
intermediary structure such as banks play an important role in the financial market. China’s banking 
sector is dominated by large state-owned commercial banks, supplemented by other commercial banks. 
Large state-owned commercial banks have a monopoly position in large-scale assets, and market 
competition often lacks market competition, which leads to low efficiency of the financial system; non-
state-owned joint-stock commercial banks have small assets, and daily investment activities are full of 
market competition, thereby improving the financial system. Based on the above considerations, this 
paper selects the ratio of the total assets of large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock banks as 
the proxy variable of the difference in financing prices. All the data of each variable is shown in Appendix. 
4.3 Regression result 
4.3.1 Financing constraint difference 
The regression results of the econometric model (Equation 30) are shown in Table 3. The results of 
the gradual regression of Model 1-3 show that the difference in financing constraints and the difference 
coefficient of wage levels are both above the 1% level. The goodness of fit of Model 1-3 are all above 
80%, indicating that the overall interpretation of the model is better. 
Among them, the difference of financing constraints has a significant negative impact on the 
difference of per capita capital stock of industrial enterprises. The difference of per capita wages of 
enterprises has a significant positive impact on the difference of per capita capital stock of industrial 
enterprises. The results verifiy the conclusions of the previous method. The third column of Table 3 
shows that the elastic coefficient of DrPS to DkPS is -0.10, that is, when the difference in financing 
constraints is reduced by 1%, the difference in per capita capital stock of industrial enterprises will be 
reduced by 0.1%. That is to say, the asset size of large state-owned banks is lower than that of joint-stock 
banks, and the competition between banks is strengthening. The difference in financing prices between 
private industrial enterprises and state-owned industrial enterprises in financial markets is also gradually 
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decreasing. It helps to reduce the difference in the per capita capital stock of industrial enterprises. The 
elastic coefficient of DwPS to DkPS is 0.63, that is, when the per capita wage difference increases by 1%, 
the difference in per capita capital stock of industrial enterprises will increase by 0.63%. That is to say, 
if the per capita wage of private industrial enterprises continues to expand relative to the per capita wages 
of state-owned enterprises, private industrial enterprises will turn to capital-intensive investment, which 
will increase the per capita capital stock of private industrial enterprises, which also reflects the 
relationship between capital and labor. An alternative role in the production process of an enterprise. 
Table 3 Regression results 
Independent Variable 
ΔDkPS 
1 2 3 
ΔDrPS 
-0.21*** 
（-8.9）  
-0.10** 
（-3.2） 
ΔDwPS  
1.06*** 
（10.0） 
0.63*** 
（4.0） 
Cons 
0.99*** 
（12.5） 
-0.90*** 
（-7.3） 
-0.08 
（-0.3） 
N 20 20 20 
R2 0.8136 0.8466 0.9037 
AdjR2 0.8033 0.838 0.8924 
F值 82.7 99.3 79.78 
Notes: ***, **, * are the 0.1%, 1% and 5% of the statistical significant level 
4.3.2 Investment effect difference between different ownership enterprise 
The regression results are shown in Table 4. The results of the gradual regression of Model 1-5 show 
that the input and output elasticity coefficients of physical capital and human capital are significantly 
positive at the significant level of 0.1%, indicating that physical capital investment and human capital 
investment have significant promotion effect on economic output of industrial enterprises. The goodness 
of fit of Model 1-5 are all above 92%, indicating that the overall interpretation of the model is better. 
Table 4 Regression results 
Independent 
Variable 
lnY 
1 2 3 4 5 
lnKS 
1.78*** 
（18.8） 
  
0.92*** 
（11.2） 
0.90*** 
（13.1） 
lnKP  
0.53*** 
（19.4） 
 
0.28*** 
（11.5） 
0.20*** 
（5.6） 
lnH   
1.61*** 
（14.7） 
 
0.29** 
（3.0） 
Cons 
-10.89*** 
（-10.4） 
3.86*** 
（14.8） 
-6.67*** 
（-8.8） 
-3.94*** 
（-5.6） 
-5.70*** 
（-6.9） 
N 20 20 20 20 20 
R2 0.9517 0.9541 0.9226 0.9945 0.9965 
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AdjR2 0.9490 0.9516 0.9183 0.9939 0.9958 
F 354.4 374.4 214.5 1538 1498 
Notes: ***, **, * are the 0.1%, 1% and 5% of the statistical significant level 
As is show in econometric model 5 the output elasticity of human capital investment in industrial 
enterprises during the period of 1998-2017 is 0.29, the elasticity of input and output of physical capital 
in state-owned industrial enterprises is 0.90, and the output elasticity of physical capital investment in 
private industrial enterprises 0.20. The total output of physical capital is more effective than human 
capital, which also verifies the investment-driven economic development model of China’s industrial 
enterprises in the past 20 years. Besides, the sum of human capital and capital output elasticity is greater 
than 1, reflecting the current economic expansion of industrial enterprises has increase in the scale of 
returns. The economic output of industrial enterprises still has a certain expansion space. However, in 
terms of subdivision, state-owned industrial enterprises have the highest capital output elasticity, human 
capital’s output elasticity is in the middle, and private industrial enterprises have the lowest capital output 
elasticity, indicating that state-owned industrial enterprises adopt capital-biased production methods, 
which further verify state-owned industrial enterprises undertake more basic investment and strategic 
infrastructure for stable economy. While private industrial enterprises adopt human capital-biased 
production methods. The reason may be that private industrial enterprises are more constrained under 
the condition that financing is strictly restricted. It tends to maximize short-term economic profits while 
human capital is the short-term optimal variable. 
5. Conclusion 
“Price discrimination” related to property ownership in China’s financial market is main financing 
problem. Compared with the private firm sector, the investment scale of the state-owned firm sector is 
obviously more expansionary, which corresponds to the problem of overcapacity and low return on 
investment. According to economic indicators, the efficiency of factor allocation is obviously “sub-
optimal” or low. However, from another perspective, since the reform and opening up, the Chinese 
economy has maintained a long-term, medium- and high-speed growth ahead of the world, and national 
income has continued to increase. The coexistence of medium- and high-speed economic growth and 
inefficient factor allocation is not convincingly explained by the popular neoclassical economic theory. 
On the one hand, the difference in financing conditions between state-owned firm and private firm is 
undeniably related to property ownership factors, which is related to institutional factors. On the other 
hand, one of the characteristics of China’s economic operation is government-driven and policy-led. In 
reality, the impact of government services related to China’s economic institutions on economic 
operations can often be observed. These institutional factors may be one of the reasons for the rapid 
growth of China’s economy. 
This paper considered economic institutions as exogenous variables affecting economic growth and 
added financial sector, state-owned and private firm sectors with different operation objectives under the 
framework of new classical economic growth model, which expands the new classical economic growth 
method. Based on above framework, this paper studied how the operation objectives affect the 
investment of different ownership enterprises, and analyzes the impact of economic institutions on long-
term economic growth on a balanced growth path. In order to test the above expanded economic growth 
model, this paper used the data from 1997 to 2017 to empirically verify the results of theoretical analysis. 
The study found that under the frame of China’s economic institution the differences in ownership and 
financing costs between state-owned firm sector and private firm sector were the main factors affecting 
the efficiency of capital allocation. In addition to the impact of input on factors of production, the path 
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of economic growth was also affected by economic institutions. 
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